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Abstract Public health research often relies on individuals’ confidential med-
ical data. Therefore, data collecting entities, such as states, seek to disseminate
this medical data as widely as possible while still maintaining the privacy of
the individual for legal and ethical reasons. One common way in which this
medical data is released is through the use of Web-based Data Query Systems
(WDQS). In this article, we examined WDQS listed in the National Associa-
tion for Public Health Statistics and Information Systems (NAPHSIS) specifi-
cally reviewing them for how they prevent statistical disclosure in queries that
produce a tabular response. One of the most common methods to combat this
type of disclosure is through the use of suppression, that is, if a cell count
in a table is below a certain threshhold, the true value is suppressed. This
technique does work to prevent the direct disclosure of small cell counts, how-
ever, primary suppression by itself is not always enough to preserve privacy
in tabular data. Here, we present several real examples of tabular response
queries that employ suppression, but we are able to infer the values of the
suppressed cells, including cells with 1 counts, which could be linked to auxil-
iary data sources and thus has the possibility to create an identity disclosure.
We seek to stimulate awareness of the potential for disclosure of information
that individuals may wish to keep private through an online query system.
This research is undertaken in the hope that privacy concerns can be dealt
with preemptively rather than only after a major disclosure has taken place.
In the wake of a such an event, a major concern is that state and local officials
would react to this by permanently shutting down these sites and cutting off
a valuable source of research data.
Keywords privacy, confidentiality, health policy, public health, data sharing
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1 Introduction
Interactive web-based data query systems (WDQS) are commonly used by
state public health authorities to provide vital statistics and health surveillance
data for use by researchers and policymakers. According to a compendium
compiled by the National Association of Public Health Information Systems
(NAPHSIS), state-supported WDQS relevant to public health are currently
hosted in a majority of states in the United States (NAPHSIS, 2016). Such
systems typically provide aggregate information to users in response to specific,
and in some cases customized, queries. Although query results are de-identified
and presented only in aggregate form, care must be taken to prevent individu-
als from being re-identified. This can potentially occur when individuals have
rare conditions or attributes (or configurations of attributes), or when ancil-
lary information, such as publicly available voter lists or death registries, can
be linked to files containing sensitive information.
Standards for protecting the privacy of individuals captured in WDQS are
well-established. For instance, the “Handbook on Statistical Disclosure Con-
trol” (HSDC) (Hundepool et al, 2006) describes many methods for protecting
against statistical disclosures in tabular data and Shlomo et al (2015) compare
different methods of statistical disclosure control based on disclosure risk and
data utility measures specifically for flexibility generated tables. The HSDC
classifies methods for protecting tabular data into three broad categories: pre-
tabular, table redesign, and post-tabular.
Pre-tabular methods involve modifying the actual microdata prior to the
table creation step. Methods in this category include, for example, data swap-
ping (Fienberg and McIntyre, 2005, Dalenius and Reiss, 1982), post-randomization
method (PRAM) (Gouweleeuw et al, 1998), and sampling (Skinner, 2009).
Data swapping involves swapping individuals’ records in the microdata in such
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a way that the marginal counts of variables are maintained. After data swap-
ping, a contingency table can be created based on the swapped data. The
resulting table has an added layer of protection by adding uncertainty to the
output. Even if a cell in the table contains a small number, there is uncertainty
as to whether the number is the actual count or not. Therefore, it is difficult
to accurately identify an individual whose data is used in the table. PRAM
aims to prevent statistical disclosures by perturbing each record in a data set,
which practically amounts to adding random noise to each record when the
data are categorical. Once this method is applied to the microdata, as with
data swapping, tables can then be created based on the perturbed data, which
now have an added layer of protection. Finally, sampling is another example
of a pre-tabular method for protecting tabular data. Sampling simply involves
selecting a subset of the data that has been collected, and then creating output
tables based on the sample of the data rather than the entire data itself. This
adds uncertainty to the table in that even if a small number appears in a cell,
one cannot be sure that the number that is being observed is the true number
from the full data set. All of these methods work, to some degree, based on
the concept of uncertainty. The data consumer cannot be sure that the num-
bers they are observing in the cells are exactly correct, which prevents them
from learning any information about an individual with certainty. At the same
time, they are able to learn about the population that they are interested in
studying based on the tables as much of the original structure of the data is
maintained.
A common example of table redesign methods is reduction of detail. Re-
duction of detail involves combining cells together based on collapsing some
of the variable categories together to make one new category. For instance,
rather than release a table with counts that are sorted by age in groups of five
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years, it is safer from a statistical disclosure point of view to use ten or twenty
year age groups resulting in fewer cells in the table.
The HSDC mentions three main methods of post-tabular disclosure control,
namely, cell suppression (Cox, 1980, 1984, Cox et al, 1987), cell perturbation
(Willenborg and de Waal, 2001), and rounding (Cox, 1984, Cox et al, 1987,
Cox, 1987). Cell perturbation adds some amount of noise to each cell to add
some uncertainty to the true value of the cell. Rounding is used to hide true
values of cells by releasing a number in the cell that is relatively close to
the truth. For instance, rather than releasing the actual counts of cells, an
organization that is releasing tabular data may round all of the cells to the
nearest 5 or 10. This guarantees that no cell with a 1, which is the most
vulnerable value from a statistical disclosure point of view, is released.
Finally, cell suppression is a technique that searches for cell counts that
are below some predefined threshold and hides the true count in the cell by
reporting the true value as missing. This technique guarantees that small cell
counts, which are vulnerable to an attack by a malicious data user, will never
be known exactly. The National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS) Research
Data Center Disclosure Manual does not allow its researchers to publish tables
with cell count less than 5; these values must be suppressed (NCHS Research
Data Center, 2012, Page 15). Further, they recommend that categories be
re-categorized so that cell suppression is not needed at all. However, the appli-
cation of cell suppression is not as straight forward as it may seem if one wishes
to provide meaningful disclosure control. Simply suppressing the true values
of cells that all fall below a threshold – these are called primary suppressions
– does not guarantee that disclosures will not take place. For instance, if only
one cell is primarily suppressed in a row, but the row total is provided in the
table, the suppressed value can be easily derived. Therefore, for the sake of
disclosure control, other cells that may not fall below the suppression thresh-
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old may also need to be suppressed. These types of suppression are referred to
as secondary, or complimentary, suppressions. The NCHS Disclosure Manual
also makes it clear that complimentary suppressions are necessary to prevent
disclosures through cell subtraction. As a result, they suggest using cell ag-
gregation rather than suppression (NCHS Research Data Center, 2012, Page
15).
Cell suppression, which is a very common method of disclosure control in
many of the NAPHSIS systems, is especially problematic in the specific setting
where the user has the ability to create many different tables via many differ-
ent queries. HSDC states, about post-tabular methods generally, “post-tabular
methods suffer the problem that each table must be individually protected,
and it is necessary to ensure that the new protected table cannot be compared
against any other existing outputs in such a way, which may undo the protec-
tion that has been applied” (Hundepool et al, 2006, Page 175). Further, they
go on to state a problem specifically about cell suppression, “Disclosive zeroes
need to be suppressed and this method does not protect against disclosure
by differencing. This is a serious problem if more than one table is produced
from the same data source (e.g. flexible table generation)” (Hundepool et al,
2006, Page 176). Both of these statements warn that these methods, generally,
post-tabular and, specifically, cell suppression, simply do not work in many
instances when the user is able to create many different tables based on the
same data set. This is exactly the case with a web-based data query system
(WDQS).
In spite of well-established guidelines for privacy protection related to
WDQS, many systems run by states still perform inadequately with respect
to privacy when data are released in tabular form. Matthews et al (In Press)
reviewed 35 state-affiliated WDQS and found that one of the most common
measures of statistical disclosure control employed by these systems was sup-
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pression of small cell counts in tabular queries. This means that one of the
more common methods of disclosure control that was observed in our review
of the NAPHSIS systems is one of the methods that is least suited to protect
privacy in exactly these types of systems (Hundepool et al, 2006, Pages 175–
176). In fact, Matthews et al (In Press) found that in 9 of the sites reviewed,
true cell values were able to be recovered even with suppression being used
for small cell counts. Further, 18 of the reviewed sites did not appear to be
suppressing any cells counts, and only in 6 sites were no immediate problems
discovered with cell suppression.
As a result, in this manuscript, we focus on the details of suppression tech-
niques employed by WDQS and illustrate problems with using suppression
as a method of statistical disclosure control for flexibly generated tables us-
ing actual examples from various systems. It is our hope that through this
manuscript institutions will become more aware of the potentially privacy is-
sues when releasing data in tabular format and will take necessary steps to
ensure that privacy for individuals in maintained.
The remainder of this article discussed the methods that were used in eval-
uating different query systems in section 2. Section 3 presents actual observed
examples of ways in which cell suppression is being employed in some online
query systems. Finally, section 4 concludes with a discussion of the impact of
these findings.
2 Methods
The National Association for Public Health Statistics and Information Sys-
tems’ (NAPHSIS) website provides a catalog of Web-based Data Query Sys-
tems (WDQS) (NAPHSIS, 2016) by state that provide a wide array of vital
statistics. In the process of performing a full review of the types of disclosure
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control techniques in place by these various systems, it became clear that cell
suppression was one of the most popular methods for controlling statistical
disclosure in spite of the limitations of the method specifically in this setting.
Additionally, many of these query systems that were performing cell suppres-
sion were implementing the technique in a manner that would often allow an
astute user to infer the exact values of the suppressed cell counts rendering
cell suppression nearly meaningless in terms of protecting sensitive pieces of
data.
Therefore, as a test, in cases where a WDQS was employing cell suppres-
sion, attempts were made by the authors to infer the suppressed values of
the cells. To demonstrate that one need not employ sophisticated and/or time
consuming techniques to recover suppressed values, the time spent trying to
recover suppressed values was limited to no more than 30 minutes for each
WDQS. This demonstrates that these disclosures are not the result of com-
plex analyses, but, rather, are based on simple attack methods that are well
established in the statistical disclosure literature.
Examples of queries (or possible a set of queries) where suppressed values
can be recovered were captured with screen shots of the table (or tables).
These screen shots act merely as a record and are not presented fully in this
manuscript to offer ambiguity in which query system produced the table in
which the suppressed cells were able to be recovered. Here we simply present
generic tables, devoid of any identifiers, each demonstrating an example of
how suppressed cell values can be recovered using different techniques. While
these tables are presented as generic, we stress the fact that all of these are
actual examples that were observed by at least one WDQS in the NAPHSIS
database.
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3 Results
Among those WDQS that claimed to incorporate SDC strategies, some form
of suppression was most commonly employed, although the standards used
(e.g., minimum cell size tolerated, whether both primary and secondary cell
suppression strategies were attempted) varied dramatically. Some WDQS’s
suppressed cell counts only below 10 whereas other systems suppressed cells
only for values below 3. In practice virtually all the systems reviewed did not
employ SDC techniques that were effective in preventing users from obtaining
results that placed individuals at risk of a statistical disclosure. In the following
sections we will illustrate the shortcomings of many public health WDQS
using actual examples. Again, to protect the privacy of the individuals whose
personal information may be compromised, we present the results of actual
queries while hiding the identity of the query systems from which they were
obtained.
3.1 Examples of disclosure
In general, there are a wide array of issues involved in statistical disclosure
control that are beyond the scope of this manuscript and for a full overview
see O’Keefe and Rubin (2015), Matthews and Harel (2011), Skinner (2009), or
Willenborg and de Waal (2001). One main issue of statistical disclosure control
is the study of techniques for modifying microdata in such a way that it can
be released to researchers or the public in such a manner that the data is both
useful and sensitive to the privacy of the individuals involved. There are many
examples of de-identified microdata being disseminated to the public that was
able to be re-identified such as Sweeney (2002), Narayanan and Shmatikov
(2008), and Barbaro and Zeller (2006). For guidelines for de-identifying per-
sonal health information microdata see El Emam and Fineberg (2009), for
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instance. Here, however, we are only interested in disclosures occurring from
data released in tabular format as output from the WDQSs examined here.
There are many different types of potential disclosures when releasing data in
this manner and section 5.2 of Hundepool et al (2006) describe these, which
include identity disclosure, individual and group attribute disclosure, and dis-
closure by differencing. Further, there are many types of risks based on the
motives of an adversarial data user. El Emam (2010) describes what they refer
to as prosecutor risk, journalist risk, and marketer risk. These different types
of risks described vary based on the background information of an adversary
and their motives. Prosecutor risk, for instance, involves an adversary who
is trying to re-identify a particular individual about whom some background
information is know and the individual is known to be in the data set of inter-
est. Journalist risk involves trying to target a known individual, but it is not
known whether the individual is actually contained in the data with certainty,
and marketer risk is when an adversary attempts to re-identify as many of the
observations in the released data as possible.
One of the most common types of disclosure, identity disclosure, occurs
when an individual can be identified in the released data. This would occur,
for example, if a table appeared with a cell count of one indicating that the set
of characteristics for that particular cell were unique. This situation presents
the possibility that the individual whose record accounts for the one in a table
cell can be linked to an individual’s identity. This type of event, locating a
cell count of 1, in and of itself, does not create a disclosure, however, it often
leads to other situations in which other types of disclosures take place and,
therefore, is to be avoided.
Another type of disclosure, attribute disclosure, occurs when new informa-
tion is discovered about an individual from the released data. This could occur
in the current setting if, upon discovering a cell with a 1 count in it based en-
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tirely on demographic characteristics, a subsequent query was made inquiring
about some attribute of this individual. This would lead to a situation where
a data user would have a combination of demographic characteristics that
uniquely defined an individual in the data as well as information about some
attribute of this individual. If this type of disclosure occurs in conjunction
with an identity disclosure, a link can then be made between the identity of
an individual and a learned attribute, such as disease status or cause of death.
While cell counts of 1 are a problem in terms of statistical disclosure control
in tables, only getting rid of 1’s will not solve the problem entirely. Another
type of disclosure, group attribute disclosure, occurs when all individuals in
group have the same attribute. This could occur if a user identifies a cell with
a small cell count, such as 2. If, upon subsequent querying, the user learns that
all members of this sub-group have the same disease, for example, a private
attribute has been learned about each of these individuals. Notice, that an
identity disclosure does not need to take place for this to occur. No record in
the data has been identified as belonging to a specific individual, but, rather,
we have learned something all individuals in the sub-group.
One last type of disclosure relevant to this situation occurs form the use dif-
ferencing. Hundepool et al (2006) describes three types of potential disclosures
by differencing which are geographical differencing (Duke-Williams and Rees,
1998), linking, and differencing of sub-populations. In the context of the query
systems we evaluated, differencing of sub-populations is very simple approach
for subverting suppression of small cell counts by releasing organizations. For
example, say an individual was looking for men who died in a certain county
at the age of 33. For a small county, this number may be very small and, if
suppression were being used, would likely be suppressed. However, rather than
querying men who died at exactly the age of 33, provided the WDQS allows
this type of query, one could query the number of men in a county who died
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Table 1 Query Result. All Deaths. Year: 2000, Age: Under 15
Male Female Total
Black 5 1 6
White 50 38 88
Total 55 39 94
who were 32 or younger followed by a query of men who died in the county
who were 33 or younger. These two queries are likely to return results that are
not suppressed because the counts are likely to be sufficiently large. However,
the difference between these two queries is exactly the suppressed value of the
original query. Fraser and Wooten (2005) propose a method to protect tabular
data against disclosure by differencing.
3.1.1 No Suppression
As an example of a potential disclosure in the presence of no employed methods
of disclosure control, consider the following set of two queries. In the first query,
the request is for a table based on all deaths of individuals under the age of
15 occurring in the year 2000 separated by race on the rows and gender in
the columns. An example of a query appears in table 1. From this table, a
user learns that based on year of death, age group, race, and gender that a
unique combination can be created. The one in the upper right cell of this
table indicates that only one black female under the age of 15 died in this
state. Therefore, a subsequent query based on data of all deaths in the year
2000 of individuals under the age of 15 whose gender was female and race was
black is based on only one data point. Therefore, if we based a query on this
data and stratify by some attribute that we are interested in learning, say
cause of death, without any disclosure control, the exact cause of death can
be learned. Table 2 is based on the one data point that was identified from
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Table 2 Query Result. All Deaths. Year: 2000, Age: Under 15, Race: Black, Gender: Female
Cause of Death Count
Heart Disease 0
Cancer 0
HIV/AIDS 1
Homicide 0
Suicide 0
a previous query and is now stratified by cause of death. This second query
allows us to learn that the cause of death was HIV/AIDS.
In summary, what a data user has learned is that within a given state only
one black female under the age of 15 died in the year 2000, and that the cause
of death for this individual was HIV/AIDS. Granted, no definite disclosure
has yet occurred. However, it is not difficult to imagine a way of identifying
exactly who this individual is especially in the digital age. Further, assuming
that this individual could be identified, they are not the only person who’s
privacy have been potentially compromised. Specifically, in this case a user
has learned that a child has died of HIV/AIDS. This likely indicates that the
mother and/or father of this child is carrying the virus, which they then passed
on to their child. This is an especially important aspect of this example to note
that private attributes of individuals’ who are not even in this database are
potentially at risk here.
3.1.2 Suppression
Encouragingly, many states at the very least acknowledge the issue of potential
statistical disclosure and have taken steps to control this. One of the most
commonly observed methods of disclosure control among the state systems
examined here was cell suppression. However, simple implementation of this
method is not enough to control disclosures in many situations. For example,
14 Gregory J. Matthews et al.
assume that the suppression rule for a query system is to return all cells with
a cell count less than or equal to 3 as missing values. This is done in an
attempt to prevent small cell counts, especially 1’s, from appearing in table
cells, which could lead to identity and attribute disclosure. However, consider
the following query based on data from a particular county of all men between
the ages of 20-24 who died in 2008 separated by race in the columns. The
results of this query are presented in table 3. The returned table contains
three cells: one for black, one for white, and one for total. As a result of a
small cell count in the cell corresponding to a race of black, the true value is
suppressed in compliance with disclosure control protocols set forth by this
table. Rather than returning the true value of the cell, an “X”, for example, is
placed in the table where the actual value would have appeared. However, even
with suppression correctly applied to this table, it should be obvious, without
even submitting another query, that the true value that is suppressed is a 1.
The cause of this problem here is that only primary suppression (Cox, 1980)
is applied to the table, whereas, from a disclose perspective, complementary
suppression would aid in limiting disclosures here. Complementary suppression
(Cox, 1980) involves suppressing cells that by themselves do not meet the
requirement for suppression, but can be used to aid in discovering the true
values of the primarily suppressed cells.
Returning to the original table, now that a 1 has been identified in a sup-
pressed cell, a subsequent query can be used to attempt to create an attribute
disclosure about this individual. This query is based on the same data as
the original query with additional subletting to include only those individuals
whose race is black. Based on the first query, it is known that the total number
of data points that this query is based on is 1. Therefore, any resulting table
can only have a 1 in it, even if the value is suppressed. The results of a query of
this kind can be found in table 4. From this table, we can infer that the cause
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Table 3 County: X, Age: 20-24, Sex: Male, Year: 2008
Race Count
Black X
White 9
Total 10
of death for this individual was cancer. In review, a data user has learned,
based only on these two queries, that there was one black male who died in
a given county in the year 2008 who was between the ages of 20-24 and that
the cause of death was cancer. Further, the data user has learned all of this
information using only two queries even in the presence of cell suppression to
control against disclosures. This is a particularly troubling example because
the operators of this query system are aware that statistical disclosure poses
a threat to individual privacy, which can be inferred by their attempts to ad-
dress this risk, but the disclosure controls are being implemented in such a
way as to be practically doing almost nothing.
Table 5 presents the results of a query of all females aged 25-44 in a certain
county by year and race. Cell suppression is implemented here as intended,
however, because row and column totals are not suppressed the values that
are suppressed can be filled in exactly with nothing more than subtraction. In
both of these examples, suppression is implemented as intended, but, in both
cases, the actual benefits from a disclosure control perspective are essentially
nonexistent. Further, these tables, by themselves, do not protect the values of
the suppressed cells, and, therefore, these tables could not even be released in
static form. Here, however, a user has the ability to flexibly create other tables,
they don’t even need to use that extra flexibility to learn the true values of
suppressed and supposedly protected cell values.
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Table 4 County: X, Age: 20-24, Sex: Male,Year: 2008, Race: Black
Race Count
All Causes X
Cancer X
Table 5 County: X, Age: 20-24, Sex: Male,Year
Year Black White Other Total
1990 82 6 X 89
1991 65 X X 73
Total 147 10 X 162
3.1.3 Subverting Suppression with multiple queries
The previous examples involving suppression demonstrated instances where
the true values of suppressed cells can be learned directly from one query.
However, in other situations it may only take one or a few additional queries
to infer the true values of suppressed cells. Consider, for example, that a data
user discovers from a previous query that there was only one white male in a
given county who died in the year 2008 who was between the ages of 25-44 at
the time of his death. The user can then submit a query based on only this
subset of attributes and separate the rows by cause of death. By restricting
the data to certain causes of death, the user can eventually get to a result as
in table 6. Therefore, the user knows the cause of death is either an accident
or a suicide. While the cause of death is not known for sure at this point, it
could be argued that this is already a disclosure as the user has learned that
the cause of death was not natural.
However, with only one additional query, restricting cause of death to only
accidents, the exact cause of death can be learned. Whereas the true value
in the accidents cell was previously suppressed, in table 7 it is no longer sup-
pressed, and it is revealed that the true value is zero. Now that the user knows
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that there were zero accident deaths, the exact cause of death here is reveled to
have been suicide. Again, in summary the user has a very specific and unique
demographic description of this individual and, through multiple queries, was
able to subvert suppression and learn the exact cause of death. Imagine if a
health provider ever release a raw data record with demographic information
that is this specific along with cause of death. This would probably not be
tolerated.
One aspect of this example that should be noted is that the true value of a
suppressed cell was learned because a cell with a zero in it was not suppressed.
Often it is assumed that there is no danger in releasing the true value of a
cell if that value is a zero. However, knowing that a cell is zero decreases the
uncertainty that a data user has about the true values of suppressed cells. Cell
values of zero can not simply be ignored from a disclosure perspective. They
are an important part of reducing disclosures in tabular count data.
Next, consider a table as in figure 1 based on data of all African-American
men who died in 2009 in a given state broken out by county and age group.
Due to suppression rules, small cell counts are being suppressed. It also ap-
pears that, along with primary suppression, secondary suppression is also being
applied here as indicated in the state’s explanation about suppression found
below the returned table. It is encouraging to see that some states recognize
that primary suppression by itself is simply not enough to prevent disclosures,
and this state has taken the next step in privacy by using secondary sup-
pression. As a result, this table, considered alone, appears to be adequately
protecting the true values of the suppressed cells, though it is unclear why
some cells have unsuppressed ones appearing in the table. Assuming that the
cells with one counts are determined to not pose a risk of disclosure, the cells
that are suppressed can be easily learned by submitting only one more well
created query. In this instance, a user can simply repeat the exact same orig-
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Table 6 County: X, Age: 25-44, Sex: Male,Year: 2008, Race: White, Cause of death: Acci-
dents or Suicide
Cause of Death Count
Accidents X
Suicide X
Total 1
Fig. 1 An example of an implementation of complementary suppression that still allows
suppressed values to be recovered.
inal query and just remove the breakdown by age. This returns a table with
only one column, where each row is the total count for a county. As a result
of this query, the suppressed row totals from the original table, which were
missing due to secondary suppression, can be filled in. This allows a user to
fill in every suppressed cell value in the table so that, practically speaking,
any protection originally provided by cell suppression is essentially voided by
performing only one additional query and arithmetic.
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Table 7 County: X, Age: 25-44, Sex: Male,Year: 2008, Race: White, Cause of Death: Ac-
cidents
Cause of Death Count
Accidents 0
4 Disclosure by differencing
In addition to the aforementioned problems with suppression, some query sys-
tems failed to address a potential attack via differencing of tables (Australian
Bureau of Statistics, 2005). This type of disclosure could occur when a user
poses a query with very specific row or column specifications. This would cause
many of the values in the returned cells would be small and thus sensitive. For
example, suppose a user wanted to know how many instances of a disease there
were by year for a specific age (e.g. 35). If these are small counties these values
will likely be very small and therefore suppressed. Table 8 show a possible
query result for a situation like this and suppresses all of the counts because
they are too small (Columns 1 and 2). However, rather than querying how
many 35 year olds have a specific condition from a certain county, a user could
pose two additional queries that are slightly different and learn the exact val-
ues of the suppressed cells in the original query. For example, a user could ask
how many people 35 years of younger have the condition and then how many
people 34 years or younger have the condition. By posing the queries this way,
in this state, the results will often be large enough to avoid most system’s
suppression rules for small cells. While this type of disclosure is certainly a
problem even for static tables, it is an especially troublesome problem when
many queries are allowed and tables can be flexibly generated.
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Table 8 Differencing: Race: White, Gender: F, County: A, Age: 35
Year Age=35 Year Age≤34 Year Age ≤ 35
1991 X 1991 23 1991 24
1992 X 1992 25 1992 26
1993 X 1993 22 1993 24
1994 X 1994 22 1994 23
1995 X 1995 19 1995 21
1996 X 1996 17 1996 18
Total 8 Total 128 Total 136
Each set of two columns in table 8 displays the results of each of three
individual queries. The first two columns show the results when querying by
race, gender, county, and specific age, in this case 35. The individual values are
suppressed due to small cell counts. However, by changing the query criteria
of age to less than or equal to 34, no results in the resulting query, columns
3 and 4, are suppressed due to small cell counts. A data snooper could then
query again changing the age criteria to less than or equal to 35 resulting in the
table displayed in columns 5 and 6, again with nothing suppressed because the
counts are large enough. As a result of the manner in which these queries were
devised, the difference between the result of the third query and the second
query will result in exactly the suppressed values of the first query. This is an
example of disclosure by difference that was actually observed in a WDQS,
which, essentially renders suppression meaningless in this context. This is yet
another example where the large amount of flexibility a user has in posing the
query, while extremely useful, presents many potential privacy problems.
5 Conclusion
The results of this inquiry into the privacy protection measures utilized in
state authorized WDQS are cause for serious concern. While many systems
recognized the need to employ statistical disclosure control techniques, the
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most common method employed was cell suppression, which is particularly
poorly suited for this specific setting (i.e flexible table generation). Further,
many systems that employed cell suppression deployed it inadequately. We
would encourage organizations that release tabular data to follow the guide-
lines put forth in the Handbook for Statistical Disclosure Control (Hundepool
et al, 2006).
As a result sensitive information from individuals whose attributes made
them easily identifiable are freely available to those who choose to seek that
information. Potential privacy issues related to causes of death were aston-
ishing, ranging from HIV to cancer. Most distressing is that this information
was so easily obtained; In no case did any of the disclosures presented above
require more than 30 minutes of work.
Aside from the obvious invasion of privacy that such disclosures may entail,
the pernicious (malicious?) use of such data can easily be used to cause tangible
harm to individuals. Unscrupulous employers and insurers, currently under
mandates by the ACA to not deny coverage for pre-existing conditions and
with lifetime coverage limits eliminated, might be well rewarded for vetting
potential employees and insured infectious diseases such as HIV that might be
transmitted to loved ones or cancers that might have a genetic basis.
Given the explosion of de-identified patient data that will be available
with the emergence of Health Information Exchanges (HIEs), it is critical
that we develop query systems that will not compromise privacy. In addition
to the public health importance of these data, many HIEs will rely on the
dissemination of ostensibly de-identified data as part of their business plan.
As we have seen, even the provision of aggregate data poses privacy risks,
and the release of record-level information, so critical to efforts to provide
population assessments, improve treatment outcomes, and facilitate quality
improvement, carries even greater risks.
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Data use agreements are a critical tool in safeguarding privacy, but consider
this: would a hospital or healthcare provider allow open access to a medical
records office so long as all visitors signed a pledge that they would not look
at anything they weren’t supposed to? Of course not, yet without restrictions
on access to what is provided in WDQS this is essentially what a data use
agreement does.
Acknowledgements
This project was partially supported by Award Number K01MH087219 from
the National Institute of Mental Health. The content is solely the responsibility
of the authors and does not necessarily represent the official views of the
National Institute of Mental Health or the National Institutes of Health.
Compliance with Ethical Standards
Conflict of Interest
None.
Human and Animal Rights
This article does not contain any studies with human participants or animals
performed by any of the authors.
References
Australian Bureau of Statistics (2005) A proposed method for confidentialising
tabular output to protect against differencing. Joint UNECE/Eurostat work
session on statistical data confidentiality
Privacy protection and aggregate health data 23
Barbaro M, Zeller T Jr (2006) A face is exposed for AOL searcher
No. 4417749. New York Times, 9 August 2006. Available:
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/09/technology/09aol.html? r=0 Ac-
cessed 9 March 2016
Cox LH (1980) Suppression methodology and statistical disclosure control.
Journal of the American Statistical Association 75:377–385
Cox LH (1984) Disclosure control methods for frequency count data. Tech.
rep., U.S. Bureau of the Census
Cox LH (1987) A constructive procedure for unbiased controlled rounding.
Journal of the American Statistical Association 82:520–524
Cox LH, Fagan JT, Greenberg B, Hemmig R (1987) Disclosure avoidance
techniques for tabular data. Tech. rep., U.S. Bureau of the Census
Dalenius T, Reiss SP (1982) Data-swapping: A technique for disclosure control.
Journal of Statistical Planning and Inference 6:73–85
Duke-Williams O, Rees P (1998) Can census offices publish statistics for more
than one small area geography? an analysis of the differencing problem
in statistical disclosure. International Journal of Geographical Information
Science 12(6):579–605
El Emam K (2010) Risk-based de-identification of health data. The IEEE
Computer and Reliability Societies
El Emam K, Fineberg A (2009) An overview of techniques for de-identifying
personal health data. Access to Information and Privacy Division of Health
Canada
Fienberg SE, McIntyre J (2005) Data swapping: Variations on a theme. Tech.
rep., National Institute of Statistical Sciences, Research Triangle Park, NC
Fraser B, Wooten J (2005) A proposed method for confidentialising tabular
output to protect against differencing. Joint UNECE/Eurostat work session
on statistical data confidentiality
24 Gregory J. Matthews et al.
Gouweleeuw J, P Kooiman LW, de Wolf PP (1998) Post randomisation for
statistical disclosure control: Theory and implementation. Journal of Official
Statistics 14(4):463–478
Hundepool A, Domingo-ferrer J, Franconi L, Giessing S, Lenz R, Longhurst
J, Nordholt ES, Seri G, paul De Wolf P (2006) A CENtre of EXcellence for
Statistical Disclosure Control Handbook on Statistical Disclosure Control
Version 1.01
Matthews GJ, Harel O (2011) Data confidentiality: A review of methods for
statistical disclosure limitation and methods for assessing privacy. Statistics
Surveys (5):1–29
Matthews GJ, Harel O, Aseltine, Jr RH (In Press) A review of statistical
disclosure control techniques employed by web-based data query systems.
Journal of Public Health Management and Practice
NAPHSIS (2016) NAPHSIS web-based data query
systems (WDQS) webpage. https://naphsis-
web.sharepoint.com/Pages/WebbasedDataQuerySystemsWDQS.aspx,
accessed 9 March 2016
Narayanan A, Shmatikov V (2008) Robust de-anonymization of large sparse
datasets. Proceedings of the 2008 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
pp 111–125
NCHS Research Data Center (2012) Disclosure man-
ual: Preventing disclosure: Rules for researchers.
http://wwwcdcgov/rdc/Data/B4/DisclosureManualpdf p 15
O’Keefe CM, Rubin DB (2015) Individual privacy versus public good: protect-
ing confidentiality in health research. Statistics in Medicine 34(23):3081–
3103, DOI 10.1002/sim.6543, URL http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/sim.6543,
sim.6543
Privacy protection and aggregate health data 25
Shlomo N, Antal L, Elliot M (2015) Measuring disclosure risk and data utility
for flexible table generators. Journal of Official Statistics 31(2):305–324
Skinner C (2009) Statistical disclosure control for survey data. In: Pfeffermann,
D and Rao, C.R. eds. Handbook of Statistics Vol. 29A: Sample Surveys:
Design, Methods and Applications, pp 381–396
Sweeney L (2002) k-anonymity: A model for protecting privacy. International
Journal of Uncertainty, Fuzziness and Knowledge Based Systems 10(5):557–
570
Willenborg L, de Waal T (2001) Elements of Statistical Disclosure Control.
Springer-Verlag
